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This study is intended to theorise rape within the Iranian context in order to offer a more 
comprehensive understanding of how rape and sexual violence are conceptualised and 
understood. Relatedly, the article examines the complex interplay between victims, 
perpetrators, the culture and the State. In order to do so, the paper starts with a discussion of 
the gender ideology of the Iranian State. This is because, as with other countries, rape in Iran 
is linked to women's status, and the broader manner in which femininity and masculinity are 
understood within society. Subsequently, the paper explores the limited statistics available on 
rape in Iran. The lack of official data in this respect reflects the fact that violence against 
women is not understood as an issue of gender inequality by the Iranian Government and the 
protection of women from violence is not a government priority. Furthermore, problematic 
attitudes towards victims of rape globally mean that women who allege sexual assault are 
often regarded as culpable, so it is not unsurprising that so few women report rape in Iran. 
This underreporting may be heightened in some religious societies in which genders 
inequality is sanctioned. However, there is evidence suggesting that sometimes the notions of 
justice, compassion and liberation have been employed by various faiths to oppose violence 
against women (Ware, et al., 2004). After laying the foundations, the paper engages critically 
with the definition of rape within the Iranian context, before embarking on theorisation of 
rape by drawing on Galtung's (1990) concepts of direct, cultural and structural violence from 
a feminist perspective (Aghtaie, 2016). The author uses the concepts of virginity, honour, and 
the centrality of sex within the contract of marriage to demonstrate the manner in which the 
absence of gender inequality and the presence of male domination within the private and 
public sphere discourages women from reporting sexual violence, and in so doing normalises, 
even condones, rape within marriage. The main focus of the paper is on rape within intimate 
relationships. This is because the State refuses to acknowledge that rape and sexual assault 
can occur within marriage.   
Iran's Gender Ideology  
The victory of the February 1979 Revolution in Iran resulted in the emergence of an Islamic 
State in which Sharia law was declared the law of the land. Currently, the State is founded on 
the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (rule of the Islamic jurist).  In order for the government to 
adhere to the framework of Islamic law, a powerful body called the Guardian Council has to 
approve all the bills passed by the parliament. The Council can veto any bills that it considers 
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inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law. Soon after the Revolution, some of the 
more liberal laws and policies were abolished due to their contradictory nature with the 
Sharia; new policies were introduced and gender inequalities became further embedded 
within the new regime. This is not to say that women enjoyed equal rights during the 
previous government. Many of the post-revolutionary ‗new‘ policies had their roots in long 
established cultural traditions (Moghadam, 1999) which understood men and women in 
specific, discreet ways, drawing on biological assumptions to bolster such constructions of 
difference.  
The gender ideology of the State, after the Revolution,  promoted the idea that women are 
prone to anti-Islamic (primarily Western) influences and can easily slip from being 
‗honourable‘ to being dishonourable while men are understood as susceptible to sexual 
temptation.  The ideology of protecting men‘s inherent vulnerability to women‘s bodies 
provided the justification for policies and laws such as compulsory veiling and gender 
segregation. A moral police force was created to implement the new policies. Their role is to 
patrol the streets to ensure that everyone, especially young women, adheres to the codes of 
modesty. Women, particularly young women who are ‗bad hijab‟, i.e. not veiled properly, 
and who are not adhering to strict sexual and moral codes, are perceived as the source of 
potential moral decay that needs to be cautioned and disciplined. Early marriage is 
encouraged to avoid illegitimate outlets for sexual gratification and therefore immorality. 
According to Moghadam, 'the themes of gender difference and the need for female 
domesticity were linked to […] the danger inherent in the female nature' (Moghadam, 2003: 
194). Therefore, men are constructed as eminently susceptible to female lures and the mere 
presence of women is said to undermine men‘s better judgment, their sanity and their 
rationality. The biological construction of men as being incapable of controlling their sexual 
desires (in most global contexts) feeds into cultural assumptions that women‘s sexuality is in 
need of control in order to purify society. Since that issues such as the virginity of unmarried 
women and restrictive codes of behaviour are important factors in maintaining familial 
honour and collective honour, those who fail to adhere to such arrangements may experience 
violence and, in extreme cases, honour killing (Kewley, 2000).   Within this context  women 
are perceived as the holders of familial and societal honour; this puts women in a vulnerable 
position in cases of sexual assault and rape because the focus will turn on women and the 
ways in which their behaviour or presentation is interpreted as unleashing men‘s supposedly 
uncontrollable desires.  
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It is important to note that the third generation- those born after the revolution—are not what 
the State expected and are constantly criticized for not adhering to the State's ideal genders 
(Aghtaie, 2016; Tremayne, 2014). According to Haeri (2009:22): '...Iranian women have 
excelled in every educational, scientific and artistic field that has been open to them... In the 
words of Ashraf Borujerdi, „women have become a presence that can no longer be ignored'. 
Also access to the internet has provided space for the discussion of gender equality, sexual 
rights, sexual pleasure and challenging the State's gender ideology  (Yaghoobi, 2012).  
However, the women's and men's resistance to gender discriminatory law and policies have 
been continuously repressed by the Iranian authorities since beginning of the Islamic 
Revolution (Amnesty International, 2016). 
 
Data on rape in Iran and cultural perceptions 
No official statistics have been published on the number of reported rape and sexual assault 
crimes, or related subsequent conviction rates. There is also a scarcity of empirical or 
theoretical research concerned with sexual violence and rape in this context. Apart from two 
studies (Shahali, et al,. 2016; Aghtaie, 2011) there are no published academic articles or 
books solely on rape and sexual violence in Iran. By using a historical court case, the latter 
paper seeks to analyse the ways in which the Iranian Penal Code responds to rape. It 
illustrates the way in which the combination of the society's perception of women and various 
shortcomings in Iranian legislation sometimes makes it difficult for the victims of rape to 
report the crime to the police, while also identifying the difficulties that the victims may face 
in proving the crime. Shahali et al‘s,. (2016: 1) qualitative research explores the barriers to 
health care provision for victims of sexual assault, by collecting the views of 23 health care 
providers and 10 victims of sexual violence through unstructured interviews and 
observations. They argue that due to extreme cultural stigma, sexual assault in Iran is hugely 
underreported, finding a 'lack of mutual understanding between health care providers and 
victims of sexual violence in relation to the expectations and priorities of victims'. There are 
few legal texts targeted at professionals and legal experts such as lawyers and judges. It is 
important to note that in these books the words ‗rapists‘ or ‗perpetrators‘ are not used, instead 
they are called „zani‟ (adulterer) or ‗accused‘ (Aghtaie, 2011). 
The only statistics available to the public take the form of sporadic information in newspapers 
reporting interviews with police officers, lawyers or government officials. For example, 
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Iran‘s police chief Morteza Ahmadi-Moghadam announced that there had been 900 officially 
recorded cases of rape in Iran in the year 2011. In an earlier report (2007), ISNA (Iranian 
Student News Agency) , in an interview with a police official, reported that sexual attacks on 
women had become one of the top priorities of the police force. In the same interview, the 
police officer stated that 40% of rapes in Iran are the outcomes of hidden friendships between 
young people and false marriage promises made by young men, who often engage in, or 
enforce sexual intimacy based on these false promises.  He expressed his opinion that it is 
parents‘ responsibility to protect their daughters by raising their awareness. In the same 
interview, he argued that if parents provide enough love, care and attention, such harmful 
incidents could be avoided. There have been other instances in which officials repeatedly 
blame women for rape crime. It is a recurring suggestion in official circles that the number of 
rapes would be reduced if women alter their behaviour, especially the way they present 
themselves in the public domain (Author, 2011). An Iranian lawyer, Mehrangiz Kar (2015), 
stated that, ―In Iran‟s courts there are many factors that influence a judge‟s decision in a 
rape case [...] The courts would claim that such incidents were consensual because there 
should be no reason for a woman to be in the residence of a man who is a stranger'. Such 
blaming attitudes reduce the number of number of women who come forward to report sexual 
crime. As mentioned previously, blaming women for rape incidences is not exclusive to Iran 
(Westmarland & Gangoli, 2011). In most cases women feel ashamed and might be held 
partially accountable by their family, peers, and community. This results in many victims not 
reporting the crime. Sometimes the Iranian State turns a blind eye to this issue and does its 
best not to publicly talk about rape. This tendency has recently been illustrated in a case 
where an 11 year old girl was gang raped (Al-monitor, 2015). Although, some officials from 
Rouhani's presidential administration voiced their views about the government's lack of 
willingness to pursue the matter, no action has yet been taken. For example, Iran‘s 
vice president for women and family affairs, Shahindokht Molavardi, criticised the  
hardliners, accusing them 'of having double standards for opposing the presence of women at 
the recent volleyball world championship games in Tehran, which they claim would violate 
the “purity” of women, while at the same time keeping silent about this crime' (Al-monitor, 
2015).In another incidence a group of women at a private party were gang raped at knife 
point. According to a press report, a group of men entered the walled garden house, locked 
some of the men in one of the rooms and tied the rest to trees and raped the female guests. It 
was reported that one of the women who was heavily pregnant was taken to the next door 
property and raped (BBC, 2011). The incidence provoked a huge protest by the locals in the 
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town of Khomeinishahar outside of the courthouse who were angry about the officials' 
silence about the case as well as being worried about the safety of the local women. The 
anger was heightened when the Imam of khomeinishahr, Musa Salemi, announced in his 
Friday sermon that 'those who were raped were not praiseworthy'. Similar comments were 
made by the town's police commander, Revolutionary Guards Hossein Yardoosti: 'I believe 
the raped women's families are to blame, because if they had proper clothing and if the sound 
of their music was not so loud, the rapist would not have imagined it as a depraved get-
together' (BBC, 2011). 
 
One of the reasons for the fact that there are no official records and statistics is that according 
to Islamic teaching, in order to protect public morality, sexual acts, whether voluntary or by 
force, should not be part of public discourse. Further, the victims of rape and their families 
are unlikely to report crimes of rape due to feeling ashamed as well as fear of losing their 
honour. Therefore, the combination of self-censorship and State censorship have closed the 
space for any public discourse and debate on the issue (Aghtaie, 2011).  
 
Definition of rape in Iran  
Aghtaie (2011: 125) notes that ‗there are no actual words in the Iranian dictionary which 
means rape. The combinations of two words tajovoz jensi or taroz jensi, which mean sexual 
attack or sexual harassment, are used as synonyms for ‗rape‘. In many cases only taroz and 
azaar are used; these words mean bothering and harassment, in so doing, they avoid the more 
serious connotations of the word ‗sexual‘. This is a clear example of how language is used to 
minimise the sexual violence experienced by Iranian women.  
Within the legal system, and in courts of justice, rapes (outside marriage) are dealt with under 
article 82 of the Iranian Penal Code which is publishable by hadd (a punishment whose 
characteristics have been described by the Sharia law).  Rape, which is referred to as zena-e 
ba onf va ekrah (adultery with force and duress) falls under the category of zena (sex outside 
marriage). Penile penetration can be either into the vagina or anus and there is no law 
prosecuting forced oral sex. The word onf means force or violence, requiring that resistance 
must be demonstrated by the victim. Ekrah could include situations in which the victim has 
not displayed any resistance due to being scared or threatened; in these cases, the intention to 
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object is evident, but is suppressed through fear. Therefore, threats to kill or hurt a woman are 
included in the definition of coercion. However, there have been cases in which the victims 
have been raped while unconscious and the perpetrator has not been punished (See Aghtaie, 
2011). 
According to article 82 of the Penal Code of Iran, regardless of the age or marital status of the 
offender, the punishment for zena, sex outside marriage, in certain cases is the death penalty. 
 This applies to  zena-e ba onf va ekrah or rape.  Situating rape as a subsection of zena means 
that women have to be co-defendants as well as complainants due to the fact that sex outside 
marriage is illegal. It is also very likely to be presumed by courts that any sexual incidents 
were consensual because, for example, there should be no reason for a woman to be in the 
residence of a man who is a stranger. This not only leaves women in a vulnerable position, it 
also might discourage them from reporting the rape crime (for detailed exploration 
concerning rape outside intimate relationships see Aghtaie, 2011). 
Proving rape and conviction 
Most countries experience prosecution and sentencing problems that reduce the number of 
convictions for crimes, including sexual violence and rape (Westmarland, 2011). This is even 
more so in Iran due to laws and policies that sanction discrimination by gender. There are 
four ways to prove zena (including zena-e ba onf va ekrah being rape). Firstly by confession, 
secondly by the testimony of four 'just' men or three just men and two ‗just‘ women (This is 
when the designated punishment is either stoning or flogging). However, there is no clear 
definition in the legal texts about who can be identified as a ‗just‘ man or a ‗just‘ woman. 
This is based on the personal views of the judge.  Thirdly, testimony of two 'just' men and 
four 'just' women is required if the designated punishment is flogging but not stoning. The 
testimony of women alone or in conjunction with the testimony of only one 'just' man alone 
cannot be used to prove zena and in fact it can be regarded as a  false accusation which is 
punishable by 80 lashes (Aghtaie, 2011). There are, then, many factors that hinder the 
prosecution of rape cases. Firstly, there is a clear over-reliance on providing witnesses to 
prove rape. This problem has been identified by Kar (2000) a prominent Iranian lawyer.  
Rape normally happens behind closed doors. She suggests that an over-reliance on providing 
witnesses stops women coming forward to file a case. Further to this, counting the witness 





Towards a theoretical understanding: 
Here I draw on Galtung‘s (1990) concepts of direct, structural and cultural violence from a 
feminist perspective (Aghtaie, 2016) to provide a better understanding of rape within the 
context of Iran. This will provide a robust framework within which sexual violence can be 
understood within intimate relationships, while also identifying the interplay between the 
victims, perpetrators, the culture, and the State. 
I have argued above that in Iran rape is often sanctioned implicitly and explicitly in through 
cultural and legal institutions, and policies that provide impunity for perpetrators, normalising 
violence against women. Galtung states: ‗Cultural violence makes direct and structural 
violence look, even feel, right- or at least not wrong...cultural violence highlights the way in 
which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus 
rendered acceptable in society' (1990: 291). Although Galtung does not specifically talk 
about structural or cultural violence in relation to gender, he sporadically applies his theory to 
gender related issues. For example, he briefly refers to patriarchy as one type of structural 
violence but fails to acknowledge that patriarchy can present itself in different forms 
(Confortini, 2006; Author, 2015a). Galtung argues that there are various aspects to cultural 
violence: religion and ideology; language and art; empirical and formal science. He 
postulates that  these aspects are used to portray violence as an acceptable and sometimes 
normal act: ‗One way cultural violence works is by changing the moral colour of an act from 
red/wrong to green/right or at least yellow/acceptable” (Galtung, 1990: 292). He calls direct, 
structural and cultural violence ‗super-types‘, and figures each of these as one of the three 
corners of a violence triangle (1990: 294). In the Iranian context men‘s sexual violence is 
sometimes normalized using difference discourses such as biological essentialism, culture 
and religion. The normalization of rape and sexual violence, within the context of marriage, 
is further condoned by the State legal system which explicitly allows men to have unlimited 
nonconsensual access to their wives' bodies; hence, there is a culturally and legally 
sanctioned failure to protect women‘s rights to refuse sex within marriage. As will be 
demonstrated below, these various tools are culturally specific and used differently and to 
varying extents in Iran. 
It is important to note that whilst it is commonly assumed that the limited gender rights 
accorded to Muslim women in Iran means that sexual violence is very different to sexual 
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violence in the UK, I argue that despite very clear differences between these two contexts, 
there are similarities as well. For example, normalisation of men's entitlement over women‘s 
bodies in certain circumstances is evident in both contexts. In the UK women are sometimes 
blamed by the society for the crime of rape for consuming alcohol prior to rape or by dressing 
provocatively (Westmarland & Gangoli, 2011). It was evident in a research conducted by 
Amnesty International in England and Wales that '34% of interviewees believed the victim 
was partially or totally responsible if she behaved in a flirtatious manner' (Westmarland, 
2011: 91). As will be discussed below, in Iran, women not might only be blamed by the 
society, but also by the jurists (Aghtaie, 2011).  Hence, it is commonly agreed that a top 
down approach, that is legal reform, is not, on its own, a sufficient means of addressing 
problems faced in rape prosecution (HM Government, 2007, 2009; Temkin and Krahe, 
2008); rather, there needs to be a shift in attitudes throughout the society by tackling rape 
myths (Westmarland, 2011).However, research has demonstrated that a top down approach 
will have some impact on people's attitudes over a period of time. For example, this has been 
evident in research on children and corporal punishment that over time legislative reforms do 
have an impact on society's attitudes towards children's physical punishment (Durrant, 2003). 
It is important to note that adopting a top down approach is not an easy task in Iran. With Kar 
(2000), Haeri (2009) believes that the Islamic State of Iran has tried to justify the 
legitimization of discriminatory laws which perpetuate gender inequality by basing its 
arguments on three presumably irreversible beliefs: the nature/nurture theory that argues 
women and men are biologically different and that this would entail different rights and 
obligations; religion, which is the sacred route for human society; and finally Islamic Sharia 
law. Such reasoning renders the mentioned laws sacred and therefore, if one were to object to 
them due to their gender discriminatory nature, she/he might be accused of blasphemy. 
Virginity and honour 
The prohibition of sex outside marriage has posed grave problems for women who have been 
raped by their boyfriends in filing a complaint: undoubtedly they would be blamed for having 
a boyfriend in the first place. Therefore, the victims of sexual attacks and rapes experience 
multiple oppressions. Not only are they the victims of male assault, they might also be 
blamed for provoking it. In addition, they could be punished through the legal system for the 
crime of adultery, receiving 100 lashes if unmarried, or being sentenced to death by stoning if 
married. These punishments are in conjunction with the possible emotional and physical 
violence to which they might be subjected by their male or female kin. Although punishment 
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such as stoning applies to both parties, it has been documented that the number of women 
who have been stoned in Iran is far greater than of men (Kusha, 2002).  Within this context, I 
would argue that holding women responsible for men's sexual aggression as a form of 
cultural violence normalises the patriarchal legal system (structural violence) and direct 
violence. In this way, 'cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, 
right or at least not wrong' (Galtung, 1990: 291). This is not to assert that all women in Iran 
are submissive victims of circumstance, or that they blame themselves for the wrongdoing of 
others, or fail to recognize men‘s violent behaviours. It is evident from existing research that 
some Iranian women discuss rape by boyfriends, and that they clearly perceive such acts as 
gender violence. In so doing, they challenge the normalization of the perception held by the 
society at large that blames girls for men‘s violent acts (Aghtaie, 2016).  
Another issue that disadvantages victims of rape is the notion of honour. In many Iranian 
families, especially those living in smaller cities, the honour of a woman and her family is 
strongly linked to the preservation of her virginity prior to marriage. El Saadawi (2007: 38) 
calls it: ‗the very fine membrane called honour‘. Mernissi (1996: 34) states: ‗the concepts of 
honour and virginity locate the prestige of a man between the legs of a woman…‘. 
Aberoo/reputation within Iranian culture coerces women to stay silent if they are raped. The 
upholding of aberoo falls mainly to women and in many situations it increases male power 
over women. Moreover, men's control of women is strengthened by the fact that the State 
condones violence in the name of honour. For example, Article 61 of the Iranian Islamic 
Qasas states: If someone kills another in defence of his honour...provided the force used is not 
excessive and it is not by government agents, then it will not be considered a crime' (Cited in 
Afshar, 1998: 173). Hence, in Iran men exert more power over women partly due to sexist 
ideology and the  lack of gender equality. Within this context the notion of aberoo (cultural 
violence), controlling male behaviour (cultural violence) and institutionalised sexism 
(structural violence:  patriarchal laws) work hand in hand to create injustice which can result 
in the normalisation of direct violence (e.g. rape, sexual assault, honour killing). Since the 
State promotes its gender ideology under the paradigm of Islam, it is difficult to overtly 
challenge the institutionalised sexism and this further normalises the double standards.  
It seems that preserving virginity till marriage and associating it with the honour of the family 
have been normalised through different structural and cultural arrangements in Iranian 
society. This is demonstrated in Farahani‘s (2008) research into the narratives of diasporic 
sexuality of several Iranian women in Sweden in which women described in detail how 
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women in Iran are socialized to conform to the cultural expectations of the society, and the 
manner in which they become self-disciplined in such a way that they adhere to set moral 
values. However, these moral values are gendered; girls and women are not only accountable 
for upholding and preserving their own virginity and upholding the family's honour, but are 
also accountable for boys‘ loss of virginity which can bring shame to the family of the 
girl/woman. The notions of shame and stigma are not exclusive to Muslim cultures, and are 
in fact common elements experienced by victims of rape within other communities (Chantler 
and Gangoli, 2011), for example, adult survivors of child sexual abuse (Feiring et al, 2002) or 
women who have experienced different forms of sexual violence (Kelly, 1988).  
It is important to note that enforcing virginity prior to marriage is not exclusive to Islam.  
Farahani (2008) has documented the fact that the imposition of premarital virginity was 
already a dominant demand amongst Zoroastrians in Iran prior to the establishment of Islam. 
In addition, Farahani claims that currently various religious sectors in Iran, such as 
Armenians, Jews and Zoroastrians and those individuals who call themselves secular to 
varying degrees, also insist on girls' premarital virginity, highlighting varying levels of 
strictness and adherence to these requirements. Therefore, holding Islam solely responsible 
for advocating and regulating women‘s sexuality is inappropriate. Patriarchy, and the control 
of women‘s sexuality within the patriarchal context, transcends religion (Chantler & Gangoli, 
2011).  
Based on the above discussion, it is fair to say that if men‘s honour and society‘s collective 
honour are closely associated with women‘s pureness prior to marriage and with men‘s 
sexual possession of women after marriage, then a woman‘s virginity could become a source 
of male domination and hence violence. The level of sexual violence and rape, its impact and 
the reporting of violent incidents are also affected further, if the legal system perceives the 
virginity of an unmarried woman as a signifier of her worth and chastity. For example, 
having a law such as arsholbekareh (compensation for losing one‘s virginity outside wedlock 
in rape cases) which has to be paid by the convicted rapist commodifies virginity and 
institutionalises the privileging of virginity. Hence, in rape cases in which the perpetrators are 
punished by death, the penalty is not because they have raped a woman but because they have 
molested another man‘s property.  
Additionally, practices such as virginity tests prior to marriage to provide certified documents 
for the future husbands verifying the woman‘s virginity or the illegal practice of 
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hymenorrhaphy by gynaecologists who reconstruct the hymen for women who have lost their 
virginity prior to marriage are all examples of how a patriarchal society controls women‘s 
sexuality and hence normalises sexual violence. They also demonstrate the difficulty of 
reporting a rape crime because of the privileging of virginity, concepts of honour, the stigma 
attached to rape and the legal system which is constructed to believing men‘s account of the 
rape, and to disbelieving the women‘s account. These issues have become more prevalent in 
the previous two decades, during which more young people have come to experience sexual 
intercourse prior to marriage (Mahdavi, 2008; Afary, 2009). Some have regarded this as a 
'sexual revolution' (Mahdavi, 2008), resisting patriarchy by not passively submitting to the 
social and legal moral codes prescribed by the State and the traditional culture. However, 
despite some changes in sexual behaviour, especially among middle/upper class families, 
women sometimes find themselves in an arena in which they are not afforded any legal 
protection if they experience rape and sexual molestation. Moruzzi and Sadeghi (2006) call 
this ‗Iranian sexual liberation on masculine terms‘:  
Rejecting the traditional Islamic conception of patriarchal authority (and 
its corollary obligation of the man to respect the honour of woman), but 
without an indigenous modern conception of feminine power (i.e., 
feminism), these young women find themselves free to experience the 
insidious double standard of their own and their society‟s masculinist 
orientation. This is the recognizably modern version of gender inequality: 
the right of the woman to be held accountable for her own relative lack of 
power (Moruzzi & Sadeghi, 2006: 28). 
Within this context, women may defy cultural oppression on an individual basis but this 
defiance does not translate into any rights or protection in the wider sphere of sexual 
relationships due to the lack of gender equality. The structurally supported gender bias in the 
form of institutionalised sexism and the traditional attitudes towards women's sexuality 
convey the message that only those women who have complied with the gender ideology of 
the State would have men's respect and protection; this is another factor that contributes to 
the normalisation of violence against those who fail to comply. It is worth noting, here, that 
the notion of sexual chastity is not necessarily equated with patriarchal oppression or 
structural bias. For example, Mahmood (2005: 15) explores the concepts of veiling and 
chastity, not specifically in relation to rape and sexual violence but in the context of Egyptian 
women's mosque movement. She suggests that the act of shyness and veiling should not be 
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looked at from a feminist lens where women‘s body and sexuality is regulated by male 
authority. Instead, these acts should be interpreted as a manner of self-disciplining of body 
and mind by Egyptian women themselves and not through the force of male authority. She 
argues that for these women veiling and shyness are first and foremost a command from God 
and hence craving for freedom and liberty should not be assumed as something which is 
universal for all women across the world. Mahmood insists that these concepts need to be 
contextualised and that we should not be fixated on one singular meaning for agency. 
Therefore, what may appear to be a sign of passiveness and docility might actually be a form 
of agency in itself. Gourgouris (2008) critiques Mahmood‘s approach arguing instead that 
perceiving a source as sacred by a political power or a certain society does not translate itself 
to being sacred by divine decree. Gourgouris's concern is not about the sacredness or non-
sacredness of a particular text, rather, he argues that where politics stem from religious 
commands, this removes any possibility of describing its nature as sacred. 
 
Marital Rape: 
Within the Iranian legal system rape within marriage or intimate relationships is not 
recognised. In fact rape within marriage is sanctioned within the legal system.   
Mir-Hosseini (2000) and Tizro (2012) have critically explored the principles of Islamic 
marriage as a legal institution which is based on a contract between the two parties, the 
woman and the man. They explain that the best way to understand any contract is to find out 
each side‘s rights and obligations. As soon as the marriage sermon is read the wife is placed 
under the husband‘s authority, control and protection. As a result men legally become 
responsible to provide maintenance, nafaghe, as soon as they get married. This is regardless 
of the wife‘s income or whether the husband has the means to pay it or not. Providing 
maintenance includes food, lodging and clothing. As Mir-Hosseini puts it: 'This right is 
absolute: it can neither be waived by agreement nor delegated' (Mir-Hosseini, 2000: 46). In 
return, to qualify for such rights, the woman must be obedient. Therefore, if the wife rebels 
against the husband‘s will, nushuz, it means that she loses her right to maintenance. This does 
not mean that if the wife is financially independent, she does not have to obey her husband. 
The full submission to the husband's will is in order as soon as the marriage sermon is read. 
This full submission and obedience to the husband, tamkin, has two dimensions: tamkin 
khaas, not objecting to sexual contact when desired by the husband and tamkin aam, not 
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leaving the household without his permission. Mir-Hosseini states: 'the rules that qualify and 
disqualify a woman for [nafaghe] revolve around the twin themes of sexual access and 
compensation' (2000: 47). She believes that although there are different schools of thought 
within Islam, they 'all relate women‟s rights to maintenance to the sexual act' (2000: 209). 
Manifestations of nushuz consist of any types of behaviour or actions that could be harmful to 
the constitution and purpose of marriage, which are satisfying sexual desires and 
reproduction.  
The term tamkin khaas, which means full sexual submission, legally endows men with the 
right to have sex with their wives on demand. Further to this, culturally, women‗s sexuality 
exists only within the framework of marriage. Therefore, marriage is perceived as a contract 
which accommodates sexual relations between the two genders. However, it is a one way 
system in which men are perceived as the active agents who must have access to sex anytime 
they desire, and women are passive agents who have to be available at all times, if needed. 
Women have to renounce their sexuality and are expected to have full self-control over any 
sexual instinct when not needed, and to be continually available and pleasing at their 
husband's will (Tizro, 2012; Aghtaie, 2015; Aghtaie, 2016). The paradoxicality of 
expectations of women as sexless before marriage and a sexual being as soon as they marry 
has been documented in previous research (SadeghiArdestani, 1988; Shahidian, 2002; Tizro, 
2012; Aghtaie, 2015; Aghtaie, 2016). Shahidian articulates this well: 
…Women are supposed to have two contradictory and mutually exclusive 
sexual selves: one, uninhibited and pleasing; the other demure, practically 
non-existent. The sexual and asexual woman lives in one, but when the 
sexual is present, namely, when in bed with her husband, the asexual 
partner departs. Conversely women should show no sign of sexuality before 
marriage or in public (Shahidian, 2002: 180). 
 
Some prominent religious scholars such as Motahari (1979) have placed their argument in the 
context of natural order, where women and men are biologically different and this therefore, 
entails dissimilar duties and obligations. He declares that within the contract of marriage, a 
man has only one right and that is the right to enjoy sex with his wife. Women are therefore 
not seen as sexual beings in their own right with their own desires for sexual pleasure, or even 
as equal partners in a sexual relationship. The founder of the Iranian Revolution Khomeini 
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stated that it is women‘s duty to accommodate their husband's sexual desire whether they feel 
like it or not. He states that ―A woman must surrender to her husband for any pleasure‖ 
(Cited in Shahidian, 2002: 179).  There is also a Koranic verse which has been interpreted by 
those with orthodox views that men have unlimited entitlement to a woman‘s body: ‗women 
are your field: go, then, into your fields as you please‟ (Koran, 2: 223). Such belief positions 
women as passive recipients of men's sexual desires, who, as such, should be available for 
intimacy when required. The perceived passivity of women's sexuality is not confined to 
certain cultures or communities. Mackinnon (1989) notes that ―women are socialized to 
passivity and receptivity‖, arguing that this has an impact on blurring the meaning of force 
and choice. When sex is violent the loss of control is explicit. However, the absence of a 
physically violent act does not ensure a sense of control for the woman. As Mackinnon puts 
it, ―sexual intercourse may be deeply unwanted, the woman would have never initiated it, yet 
no force may be present” (1989: 177).  However, within the Iranian context, the coercive 
nature of male domination is normalised further by using religion/interpretation of religion as 
a powerful legitimiser.  Within the domain of tamkin khaas, the absence of coercion does not 
mean that women are exercising free agency. Women might feel that they have to provide a 
sexual service for their husbands as part of their religious duties or cultural norms regardless 
of their own feelings. This demonstrates how using culture or religious discourse could 
normalise structural or direct violence, thus preventing some women from challenging or 
reporting their husband's violent acts. This is clearly depicted in qualitative research (Aghtaie, 
2016) that examined the attitudes of Iranian students in Iran to gender based violence. One 
participant's response to the notion of tamkin khaas and whether a woman can say no to her 
husband for sex is particularly telling: 
No they should never say „no‟. There is a hadith [prophet‟s saying] about this: if the 
wife says no to her husband, the angels will curse her till morning. Men are much 
more sexual than women 
However, this view was not shared by all participants in this study; some believed in 
women's rights to ownership of their bodies and considered that if women do not consent to 
sexual contact, then it is marital rape.  
Najmabadi (1998) has described tamkin khaas in marriage as a way of suppressing women 
and encouraging the notion of superiority of men over women. Kar (2000) believes that 
articles such as 1108 of the Civil Code of Iran – outlining that women lose their rights to 
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maintenance for refusing to have sex with husbands – denies a women any rights in her 
marital bed. She declares that some judicial authorities do not condemn men's sexual 
perversions, but rather encourage women to be obedient and to return to their volatile marital 
homes. 
It should be mentioned that not all male jurists agree with tamkin khaas. Based on empirical 
research, Aghtaie (2015) declares how some lawyers in Iran translate the notion of tamkin 
khaas to nothing but marital rape that encourages violence in marital relationships. Rajaee 
reports the view of those who believe that: ‗logically no reading of religion necessarily leads 
to violence, but some narratives may pave the way for it‘ (Rajaee, 2007: 206). Therefore, it 
depends how those narratives are being interpreted. Muslim feminists and women‘s rights 
advocates have critically engaged with the formerly taboo issue of tamkin khaas. In an article 
titled ‗obedience‘, Shukri and Labriz (1992) interrogate the concept of tamkin khaas 
questioning the legitimacy of such laws within the domain of Islamic law and jurisprudence. 
They challenge the obligatory notion of such a contract and bring attention to the resultant 
injustice if women‘s feelings at the time of intercourse are not taken into account as one of 
the important criteria within the framework of marriage. Mir-Hosseini (1996) argues that such 
laws are male constructs, and encourages a feminist reading of the Koran. However, those 
who follow traditional values bring in evidence from Islamic texts such as: „in the fear of 
nushuz (disobedience) and addam-i-tamkin, a husband has the right to punish his wife‟ 
(Badieh, 82, cited in Kar, 2000:65). Or: „if a man hit his wife, he should be punished unless 
the wife does not tamkin (in both senses aam and khaas)‘ (Badieh: 82, cited in Kar, 2000: 
65).It is important to note that objectifying women, and the regulation of women's sexuality, 
transcend the Muslim context. It has been evident that patriarchy might present itself in 
different guises depending on time and space. For example, Hester (1992) uses the example 
of the early modern witch-hunt in England to demonstrate and theorize the continuity and 
persistence of male domination, at different times and in different places, by arguing that men 
use historically specific features to subjugate women. From this it is evident that male 
domination presents itself in different manifestations depending on the specific context and 
time. Mackinnon (1989) echoes the same view, stating that male dominance exists in different 
forms across different cultures; elements that are construed as markers of women‘s sexual 
difference from men becomes the focal point of their inferiority. This means that whatever 
characterizes women‘s sexuality, also positions them as inferior. Within this framework, 
women in different locations can be perceived and treated in ways that men want to perceive 
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and treat them. These prevalent social and cultural practices normalise and present as socially 
‗right‘ and ‗nature based‘ activities that violate women, but which would not be considered as 
violent, such as rape within marriage or pornography.    
Help seeking 
Previous research has shown that victims of rape are less likely to report rape and more likely 
to delay seeking support and medical care if they live in a society where traditional attitudes 
towards women's sexuality in which rape and sexual assault are associated with loss of 
honour for the victim, family and community (Kamimura et al,. 2014; Lievore, 2005; 
Gangoli, 2011). Shahali et al,. (2016) report on distinct approaches to the response to rape in 
various countries: in Australia, for example, the victims of rape and sexual assault are 
considered in terms of safety, protection, emotional needs – including not being held 
accountable for the crime - medical help, and practical support such as seeking legal help; in 
Iran, on the other hand, victims are more concerned about hymenoplasty and abortion. These 
concerns can be attributed to the cultural and legal moral codes which coerce women to 
remain virgins. Shahali et al,. (2016:6) find that the absence of family support, due to issues 
of honour, and the fact that healthcare workers are not free of discriminatory attitudes, 
represent additional barriers to victims seeking support. They argue that there is a „need to 
strengthen both the capacity and resources of the current health system. This can be achieved 
through the work of policymakers and administrators within the health system…‟.However, it 
is difficult to see a significant shift in policymakers‘ willingness and efforts to offer high-
quality provision of medical care, treatment and counselling, given that Iranian law is 
complicit in the discriminatory treatment of victims of rape and sexual assault. The starting 
point would be for the State to commit itself to gender equality and addressing the shortfalls 
in the criminal justice system, while also creating space in the media for fight against the 
stigma long associated with this crime, in order to facilitate a necessary shift in public 
attitudes.  
Conclusion  
In this article, I have explored the various structural, cultural, religious, and legal 
impediments to justice faced by women experiencing rape and sexual assault in intimate 
relationships in Iran. I have argued that there are many shortfalls within the Iranian legal 
system concerning rape.  For example, it is grossly unreasonable to require the provision of 
numerous eyewitnesses to the act of rape, because rape normally happens in the private 
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sphere, away from other people‘s presence. In addition, basing the credibility of a person's 
testimony on her/his gender conveys the message to the male perpetrator that he lives in a 
society where gender discrimination and inequality are legally sanctioned and where women 
are treated as second class citizens. Within this framework, women's alleged inherent 
emotionality and deficiency of rational judgment are normalised and portrayed as facts using 
religion or interpretation of religion as a tool. So religion works as a largely unquestioned 
coercive control mechanism which legitimizes structural and cultural violence. I am not 
implying that women who do not live in a non-theocratic country or under different religious 
ideologies such as Christianity and Judaism, are not subjugated or that women prior to the 
Iranian Revolution were free from gender discriminatory laws. Violence against women 
transcend any religion, but we cannot ignore that gender discriminatory laws that employ 
religious discourse act to legitimise and normalise violence.   
I have argued that the full spectrum of institutionalised sexism as a form of structural 
violence - such as secondary victimisation of rape survivors by punishing the victims or 
sanctioning rape within the framework of marriage as well as normalisation of rape by 
upholding women responsible for the crime of rape - have posed significant obstacles to the 
support that victims of rape are able to receive. I have demonstrated how men‘s sense of 
entitlement to women‘s bodies, especially within marriage, stems from either culture, 
religion/misinterpretation of religion and the ways in which both work to normalise men‘s 
sexually aggressive behaviour. Then this normalisation is justified by using a biological 
discourse depicting men as creatures who do not have any control over their sexual desires if 
enticed. In addition, using religion/interpretation of religion to promote concepts such as 
tamkin khaas (cultural violence), supported by the legal system (structural violence) not only 
normalises marital rape (direct violence), it also makes it difficult to oppose such laws.  
Not only the Iranian State coerces women to remain a virgin prior to marriage through legal 
codes, the cultural moral codes have become a source of women's subordination. As 
discussed, the notion of aberoo/reputation and the discourses of ‗bad‘ and ‗good‘ woman 
based on her sexual chastity imposed by society at large prevent women from reporting 
crimes of rape and sexual violence within and outside intimate relationships. Further to this, 
the cultural discourse of who is a ‗bad‘ or ‗good‘ woman based on her purity and the support 
of such discourses by the legal system  focuses on women, their behaviour and actions rather 
than on men who perpetrate the violence. Within such a gender-biased context, women are 
not only accountable for upholding and preserving their own purity and virginity before 
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marriage but are also accountable for men‘s loss of control. Hence it seems that the Iranian 
State fails to perceive rape as violence against women, or to see it as a power issue stemming 
from unequal gender relations, conceiving of women as agents rather than victims. 
Consequently, certain fundamental beliefs about women and their sexualities might appear as 
'natural' and any deviation from presumed 'natural' sexuality is penalised. Hence, there is 
need for radical change and the first step would be to usher in legal reform and to make sure 
that the new changes are implemented by the judiciary. As mentioned earlier, the State also 
needs to take the necessary steps to dismantle long-standing  discriminatory attitudes about 
women's sexuality, their bodies  and their place in the society.  
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